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THE CHILD-WELFARE SYSTEM AND
THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY
CLARE HUNTINGTON*
I
INTRODUCTION
To read Robert Mnookin’s seminal 1975 article, Child-Custody
1
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, is to see a
blueprint for legislative action. To a remarkable degree, the reforms Mnookin
proposed to the child-welfare system are what Congress and the states adopted
in the following two decades. And yet reading Mnookin’s article is also a
Groundhog Day experience. The problems he described with the child-welfare
2
system nearly forty years ago sound all too familiar today.
Mnookin famously argued that the best-interests standard was
3
indeterminate in the context of the child-welfare system. According to
Mnookin, this open-ended standard created several notable failings: It could
not identify families truly in need of intervention, it took little account of the
dangers inherent in foster-care placement, and it did not move children through
4
the system expeditiously. As a result, too many children were removed from
5
their homes unnecessarily and then left to languish in the limbo of foster care.
To address these problems, Mnookin proposed a more determinate standard to
replace the best-interests test. To limit removals to cases where foster-care
placement was truly needed, he proposed that states remove a child only where
her physical health was in immediate danger and there were no reasonable
6
means available for protecting the child within the family. And, to move
children more quickly through the system, he proposed a time limit on efforts to
7
reunify the family.
Copyright © 2014 by Clare Huntington.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Katharine Bartlett, Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Nestor Davidson, and Elizabeth Scott for insightful comments and suggestions.
1. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975).
2. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).
3. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229.
4. See id. at 268–77.
5. Throughout this article, I use the term “removal” in its general sense to mean the decision to
take a child from her home and place her in an alternative setting. I do not differentiate among the
various procedural postures for removing a child. For a description of such various procedural postures,
see Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child
Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 457–58 (2003). Chill notes, however, that most children
are removed on an emergency basis. Id. at 458.
6. See infra text accompanying note 32.
7. See infra Part II.A.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress undertook serious and sustained reforms
to the legal standards governing the child-welfare system, largely moving in the
direction Mnookin advocated. In one reform, Congress tried to stem the tide of
foster-care placement by requiring states to provide family-preservation
8
services, intended to keep children in their original homes. Although this
requirement fell short of Mnookin’s determinate standard for removals, it was
in the same spirit of preventing foster-care placement by treating families with
children still at home. In a later reform, Congress more fully embraced an
aspect of Mnookin’s determinate standard, requiring states to adopt a time limit
9
on family-reunification efforts.
Despite these considerable changes to the standards governing child
welfare, the reforms have had mixed success in changing actual practice on the
ground. Determinacy on the front end—accurately identifying which children
should be removed from their homes—remains challenging, and efforts to focus
on family preservation have had a very modest impact on keeping children at
home. We have not fully invested in these programs and doing so is difficult in
the face of continued resistance to family-preservation efforts. But even with
additional funding, it is not clear these programs can effectively prevent fostercare placement.
By contrast, determinacy on the back end—moving more children out of
foster care—is easier to achieve. The time limit on reunification efforts has had
the intended effect of shortening stays in foster care. This determinacy,
however, has come at a real cost. Fewer children are returning home, and one
reason children are moving more quickly out of foster care is because they are
10
going to adoptive homes and guardianships. Whether this trade-off is an
improvement over the old system, where children spent more time in foster care
but were also more likely to return home, is a matter of considerable
controversy. But it is clear that a more expeditious timeline puts considerable
pressure on parents to make the required changes in time to regain custody.
Mnookin predicted this problem but believed that a determinate standard
11
would, ultimately, create a fairer system that benefitted children. The darker
side of time limits is that more children are now emancipated from foster care,
neither returning home nor finding a permanent home with an adoptive family
or a guardian.
With the evidence on the results of determinacy now in hand, it is time to
12
reflect on the possibilities and limits of the child-welfare system. Wellintentioned reforms of the legal standards that govern the child-welfare system
have done little to address the larger problems that underlie child abuse and
neglect—particularly poverty, social isolation, substance abuse, and parental
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra text accompanying note 50.
See infra text accompaying notes 60–63.
See infra Part III.B.2.
Mnookin, supra note 1, at 293.
See infra Part IV.

8_HUNTINGTON_EIC (RECOVERED)_JCI (3) (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

8/8/2014 10:37 AM

THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY

223

stress. By the time a family is ensnared in the system, it is often too late for even
the most carefully calibrated legal standard to address the crisis that led the
state to intervene. The emphasis on family preservation has not created a
system that effectively addresses underlying problems, and indeed any efforts
that come this late face considerable hurdles. The time limits help move
children to permanency, but at a substantial cost.
What the child-welfare system needs is a fundamental reorientation toward
prevention. Broad-based “family support” programs funded through the childwelfare system offer a promising model, and it is here that we should place our
real efforts. And for those children who are removed from their homes—there
will always be some—the child-welfare system should develop more realistic
goals for them and their families. In short, rather than tinkering with the
13
machinery of the child-welfare system, we should work to build a different
machine.
II
A SEA CHANGE IN DETERMINACY
A. Mnookin’s Critique
In Child-Custody Adjudication, Mnookin compared litigation in two
contexts: the child-welfare system and private disputes between parents. He
argued that in both situations the best-interests standard was indeterminate
because decisionmakers cannot make accurate predictions about what is best
14
for any particular child, and, even if they could, there is no societal consensus
15
about what is best for children. In the child-welfare system, Mnookin
contended that this indeterminacy had two significant ramifications.
First, the indeterminate best-interests standard did not consistently identify
which cases required foster-care placement. As Mnookin explained, in cases
where the court found that a child has been subject to, or is at risk for,
maltreatment, the question for the court was whether to remove the child or
16
keep her at home. At the time Mnookin was writing, most states used the bestinterests standard to make this decision or, in an even more profoundly
17
indeterminate manner, simply left the issue to the discretion of the judge.
Mnookin argued that rather than enforcing minimum standards of
acceptable parenting, the best-interests standard invited state actors to look

13. Cf. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”).
14. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 249–60.
15. Id. at 260–61. As Mnookin stated, “Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less
ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself.” Id. at 260.
16. See id. at 243 & n.80 (describing how the “jurisdictional” phase of a child-welfare case, when
the court determined maltreatment, posed no real hurdle to state involvement, and that the main issue
was in the “dispositional” phase, when the court decided what to do with the family).
17. See id. at 243 n.81 (citing each state’s standard at the time).
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18

broadly into a family’s life, allowing a judge to use her personal values when
19
reviewing a case and opening the door to class bias. Further, Mnookin
believed the indeterminate standard was biased in favor of removal because a
court weighed the known dangers of the family against the unknown and
20
arguably unappreciated dangers of foster care. Finally, the best-interests
standard did not require a decisionmaker to determine whether the child could
be protected through preventive services to the family rather than removal to
21
foster care. In all these ways, Mnookin contended that the standard did not
accurately identify those children truly in need of foster-care placement.
Second, Mnookin argued that by consigning children to foster care, which
has numerous risks, the standard did not speed children toward a permanent
22
home, either back with their families or in a new adoptive family. Instead,
children moved from one foster-care placement to another, remaining in foster
23
care for years. Mnookin believed that the indeterminate standard was part of
the problem because the standard did not require state actors to evaluate
24
whether a foster-care placement was serving an individual child’s interests.
Decisionmakers could simply cite broad reasons for their decisions, which often
25
were not grounded in a particularized determination of a child’s situation.
As part of his research, Mnookin sent observers to the annual reviews
26
required under California state law. Two-thirds of the hearings lasted for two
27
minutes or less, and only six percent lasted longer than ten minutes.
Additionally, written reports submitted by social workers were simply a recital
of what had happened since the last review and did not include a detailed action
28
plan for the child. Mnookin was most struck by the failure of the reviews to
push the case in a particular direction, either returning the child home or
moving toward adoption. In most cases, the court simply decided to continue

18. Id. at 268–69.
19. Id. at 269–70. Mnookin reviewed cases where this had occurred. Id. at 269 n.194.
20. Id. at 270. Mnookin identified three ways foster care could psychologically damage a child: the
removal itself, the placement in a home where the child’s status was uncertain and unfamiliar, and the
high turnover of social workers and judges in the case. Id. at 270–71. Mnookin also noted that there
were methodological difficulties with gauging whether foster care harms or benefits children in general,
and also that there was no reliable way for a judge to make this determination with respect to any given
child. Id. at 271–72.
21. See id. at 272. As Mnookin described, many families could be well served with targeted
support that addressed the problems in the family, but the state is not required to provide these
services, and in many instances there is no attempt by the state to help keep families together. Id.
22. Id. at 273.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 273–74.
26. Id. at 274 (describing the annual reviews for each child in foster care, which were intended to
look back at what had happened to the child during the year and look forward to the plans that were
being made for the future). The study involved an observation of every annual review in one county
during a one-month period, a total of 177 cases. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. Few parents and even fewer foster parents attended the proceedings. Id.
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29

care.
Unlike private-custody disputes, where Mnookin concluded that there was
30
no opportunity for meaningful reform, it was possible to address some of the
problems in the child-welfare system, Mnookin believed, by reforming the bestinterests standard. His two-part reform was intended to limit the number of
children entering foster care and to move those children who did enter the
system more quickly, either back to their biological families or into adoptive
31
homes.
To limit the number of children entering foster care and ensure greater
consistency, Mnookin proposed to cabin judicial discretion by making the
standard both more objective and more determinate. He argued for a clearer
formulation of the removal standard:
A state may remove a child from parental custody without parental consent only if the
state first proves: (a) there is an immediate and substantial danger to the child’s
health; and (b) there are no reasonable means acceptable to the parents by which the
32
state can protect the child’s health without removing the child from parental custody.

Mnookin believed that this reform would lead to far fewer removals because
differences in values, for example those that might be based on parents’ unusual
33
sexual practices, would not enter the decisional framework, and the provision
34
of services, such as housecleaning for the dirty-home cases, would enable
35
children to remain in their homes. The focus on threats to health would also
narrow the scope of removal cases to those where intervention was most likely

29. Id. at 275. Mnookin also described the problems with the adoption system. He studied the
adoption process in California and concluded that social workers were reluctant to push for adoption
and, instead, pursued adoption only where biological parents were largely out of the picture and thus
would not contest the adoption. Id. at 275–76. Additionally, when adption was pursued, it was usually
not the product of a push by social workers; rather, it was usually the result of external pressure, such as
the request by a foster family to adopt the child. Id. at 276. Mnookin concluded that the reticence to
pursue adoptions was due largely to social workers’ preference for the status quo. Id.
More broadly, Mnookin argued that protecting children raises a series of difficult public-policy
questions, such as determing when the state should try to encourage the formation of new psychological
ties for a child rather than seek to return the child home, when the state should consider termination of
parental rights and adoption, and who should make these decisions and using what criteria. Id. at 280.
Mnookin believed that a flexible, discretionary, and indeterminate standard, such as the best-interests
test, did not force courts or the child-welfare bureaucracy to answer these questions systematically. Id.
30. See id. at 282.
31. See id. at 277–81.
32. Id. at 278.
33. See id.
34. JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 125 (1998) (describing the different
kinds of cases in the child-welfare system and noting that approximately fifty percent of cases involve
poverty-related neglect, such as inadequate child care or dirty homes).
35. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 278. Mnookin acknowledged that his standard did not clarify how
far a state must go to try to keep a child in her home. By asking the state to deploy “reasonable” means
to keep the child at home, for example, the standard necessarily allows the court to consider the cost of
the efforts required. Id. at 279. Mnookin was clear, however, that one goal of the standard was to
encourage states to invest more money in efforts to keep children safe in their own homes. Id. at 279
n.224.
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36

to protect the child. He acknowledged that trial judges would still have
considerable discretion to determine when a danger was “immediate and
37
substantial,” but at least the standard would lead to fewer cases of removal.
To move children more quickly through the foster-care system after
removal, Mnookin sought a standard that would maximize continuity and
stability for the child. He thus proposed a fixed period of time for returning a
38
child home from foster care. During this time, the state would make
“reasonable efforts” to work with the parents and create a safe environment for
39
the return of the child. If, at the end of that period, the child could not safely
return home, the presumption would shift from reuniting a child with her
biological family to finding an adoptive home or another long-term, stable
40
placement. The length of time might depend on the kinds of issues facing the
family, but the period would be determined at the outset, when the child was
removed from the home, and would be set using criteria that could be
41
consistently and fairly employed in other cases. Further, at the time of
removal, the state would need to detail for the court the kinds of services it
42
would offer to the parents to address the problems that led to the removal.
Periodic reviews would ensure the state was doing what it could to help parents,
and, importantly, place the burden on the state to show why the child could not
43
safely return home. Mnookin acknowledged the problems with a fixed
period—it might end too soon from the perspective of some parents, or too late
from the perspective of some children—but argued it would be preferable to
the indeterminate best-interests standard, which permitted repeated extensions
44
even when a child was unlikely ever to return home.
B. Congressional Responses to Indeterminacy
These criticisms by Mnookin and others were highly influential, contributing
45
to an overhaul of the child-welfare system in 1980. In the Adoption Assistance
36. Id. at 278. Mnookin distinguished physical dangers to a child—which, he argued, would likely
be addressed by placement in foster care—from emotional dangers. It is more difficult to predict when
a child is emotionally endangered and there is no evidence that foster care would be an improvement
over a home situation. For this reason, he thought dangers to a child’s “health” should be limited to
physical dangers. Id. at 279–80.
37. Id. at 278.
38. Id. at 280.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 280–81.
44. Id. at 280, 292–93.
45. For a summary of this history, see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 187–88 (2005) [hereinafter GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS] (describing the widespread discontent with the foster-care system and particularly the
perception that too many children were removed from their homes and were staying in foster care too
long). See also Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What To Do About It: Is the
Problem that Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or that Too Many
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46

and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), Congress took several steps, many
of which reflected Mnookin’s critique of the system. In a sea change from prior
policy, which emphasized removal and extended foster-care stays, two stated
goals of AACWA were avoiding removal by keeping children safe in their
47
48
homes and returning children to their families from foster care.
AACWA did not adopt Mnookin’s more determinate standard that no child
should be removed if there are reasonable means to keep the child safely at
home, but Congress did take a step in that direction. AACWA required states,
as a condition of receiving federal child-welfare funds, to allow the removal of
children only where “the removal from the home was the result of a judicial
determination . . . that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of
such child and . . . that reasonable efforts” to keep the child in the home had
49
been made. AACWA’s standard thus only required the provision of services,
and indeterminate language—“contrary to the welfare of the child”—remained
at the heart of the inquiry. Even so, the new standard did emphasize the
importance of family-preservation efforts.
Crucially, AACWA changed the funding structure for foster care. Rather
than reimbursing states only for the cost of foster care, which created an
incentive for removal, AACWA authorized funds for “preservation services,”
intended to prevent the removal of children, and “reunification services,”
50
intended to speed the return of children back to their homes. (Subsequent
legislation, the Family Preservation and Family Support Act of 1993, authorized
additional funding for these services as well as broader “family support” efforts,
51
which are intended to keep families out of the child welfare system entirely. )
Other aspects of AACWA were consistent with Mnookin’s recommendations
as well, such as the requirement that states develop a system for tracking
52
children and reviewing their placement goals.
Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 J. CONST. L. 141, 141 (1999) (describing the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as a response to the critique of the foster-care system by Mnookin and
others).
46. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C) (2000) (“preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their
families by identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing
breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible”).
48. Id. § 625(a)(1)(D) (“restoring to their families children who have been removed, by the
provision of services to the child and the families”).
49. Id. § 672(a)(1); see also id. § 671(a)(15) (requiring states, as a condition of receiving funding, to
ensure that in each case, “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and unify families—(i) prior to
the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from
his home; and (ii) to make it possible for the child to return to his home”).
50. Id. at §§ 670–676.
51. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13711, 107 Stat. 649, 649 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629 (1994)),
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (2000) (requiring states, as a condition of receiving funding, to
“provide[] for the development of a case plan . . . for each child receiving foster care maintenance
payments under the State plan and provide[] for a case review system . . . with respect to each such
child”); see also id. § 675(5)(C) (1994) (requiring reviews by an administrative or judicial body “no later
than eighteen months after the original placement (and periodically thereafter during the continuation
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The promises of AACWA, however, never materialized. Instead, the fostercare population soared through the 1980s and 1990s, with more children
53
entering foster care, staying longer, and experiencing multiple placements.
There are numerous explanations for these trends, including the increasing use
of crack cocaine in low-income neighborhoods and the failure of Congress to
authorize, and states to provide, sufficient funds for preservation and
reunification services, despite changes to the funding structure of foster care
54
intended to promote alternatives to removal. Indeed, studies from the late
55
1980s found that states often did not in fact provide preservation services, and
that courts either ignored this requirement or simply rubber-stamped the state’s
56
assertion that it had provided services.
The increases in placement and the extended stays in foster care set the
stage for the next major wave of foster-care reform. In 1997, Congress enacted
57
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which dramatically altered the
child-welfare landscape. Both Congress and the Clinton administration had
found that the child-welfare system was not serving the interests of children
because family-preservation efforts were keeping some children in dangerous
homes, the problem of “foster care drift,” (the term used to describe both long
stays in foster care and placement in multiple homes) was getting worse, and
children would be better served by promoting adoption rather than family
58
preservation. Congress thus sought to move children to permanent homes
more quickly and to make child safety, rather than family preservation, the
59
paramount concern of the child-welfare system.
of foster care)”).
53. See STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., 2012 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND DATA AND MATERIAL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
tbl.11-4
(2012)
[hereinafter
GREEN
BOOK],
available
at
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/2012/CW%2
0Table11-4_FC-Entering_Served_Exiting_Incare_82-11%20RM-ES.pdf (tracking foster-care rates);
GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 188.
54. See GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 188–89
(describing these explanations, and noting that although AACWA authorized funds for preservation
and reunification services, Congress never allocated the funds, or at least not sufficient funds; further
noting that “[b]etween 1981 and 1983, federal foster care spending grew by more than 400 percent in
real terms, while preventive and reunification spending grew by only 14 percent”).
55. See, e.g., MARY ANN JONES, PARENTAL LACK OF SUPERVISION: NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCE OF A MAJOR CHILD NEGLECT PROBLEM 29, 64 (1987) (finding that in fifty-two
percent of cases, the most pressing need was day care or babysitting, but that the state typically offered
foster care rather than child care).
56. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS:
STEPS FOR KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER 8 (1987) (finding that numerous judges “remain unaware of
their obligation to determine if reasonable efforts to preserve families were made,” and that even when
the court did make such inquiries, judges “routinely ‘rubber stamp[ed]’ assertions by social service
agencies” that such services had been offered).
57. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
58. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 646–50 (1999).
59. ASFA conditioned federal funds on states developing a foster-care and adoption-assistance
plan in which “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)

8_HUNTINGTON_EIC (RECOVERED)_JCI (3) (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY

8/8/2014 10:37 AM

229

The centerpiece of ASFA was a determinate standard that set a time limit
on family-reunification efforts, much as Mnookin had advocated. The time limit
was not tailored to individual families, as Mnookin proposed, but it was clear
cut: As a condition of receiving federal funds, states had to commence
proceedings to terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster
60
care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. Congress also required
states to conduct a permanency hearing within twelve months (shortened from
61
eighteen months) of a child entering foster care, and created greater incentives
62
for adoption by giving subsidies to adoptive families. ASFA established three
permissible exceptions to the time limit: the child is living with a relative, the
state provides a compelling reason for not seeking termination of parental
rights, or the state has not make “reasonable efforts” to work with the family to
63
return the child home.
Additionally, ASFA broadened the focus of existing family-preservation
funding, which diluted the focus on family preservation and reunification.
Calling the new program Promoting Safe and Stable Families, Congress
expanded the scope of the funding stream to include services to promote and
64
support adoption and adoptive families.
C. State Legislation
States responded to these congressional conditions on federal funding by
adopting some version of the family-preservation and time-limit requirements.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia now require their child-welfare
agencies to provide preservation services, although states typically do not
65
specify what kinds of services a family is entitled to receive. Arizona, for
example, simply requires its child-welfare agency “to promote the well-being of
the child in a permanent home and to coordinate services to strengthen the

(2006). There were other goals as well, including a focus on child well-being and improving innovation
and accountability. See generally Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families
Act (ASFA), in URBAN INST., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A
LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 8, 16–17 (2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351_safe_families_act.pdf.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). Additionally, the state must file for termination of parental
rights without seeking to preserve the family in other specified circumstances, for example, where (1)
the parent has subjected the child to certain aggravating circumstances, including abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse; (2) the parent has murdered another child; or (3) the parent’s
rights have been involuntarily terminated with respect to another child. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii).
61. Id. § 675(5)(C).
62. Id. § 673b.
63. Id. § 675(5)(E).
64. Id. § 629b(a)(4)–(5). The two existing service areas—family preservation and family
reunification—remained.
65. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR
CHILDREN: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws_policies/statutes/reunify.pdf (listing statutes).
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66

family.” Other jurisdictions provide somewhat more detailed guidance, such as
the District of Columbia, which defines family-preservation services to include
“[r]espite care services,” and “services designed to improve parenting skills and
67
abilities.”
Illinois defines “family preservation services” to include
homemakers, counseling, family therapy, group therapy, self-help groups, drug
and alcohol abuse counseling, vocational counseling, and postadoptive
68
services.
No state, however, has adopted Mnookin’s stringent removal standard:
conditioning removal on a showing that there are “no reasonable means” to
69
keep the child at home. Instead, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
continue to use some variant of the best-interests standard to determine
70
whether to place a child in foster care. States often list overarching goals to
71
inform the standard, such as the preference for avoiding removal, or protecting
72
the health and safety of the child, but only twenty-one states and the District
73
of Columbia list specific factors that courts must consider. The remaining
74
twenty-nine states simply give general guidance, stating, for example, that
courts should “remove the child from the custody of his or her parent or parents
only when it is judicially determined to be in his or her best interests or for the
75
safety and protection of the public.” In this way, despite a greater emphasis on
family preservation, the underlying removal standard has not changed much
since 1975 and is not significantly more determinate.
Turning to the time limit, all states have incorporated ASFA’s time limit,
either by amending state laws or by incorporating the requirement into
76
regulations or administrative policies. Thirty-two states and the District of
Columbia have incorporated ASFA’s three permissible exceptions to the time
limit: (1) the child is living with a relative, (2) the state provides a compelling
reason for not seeking the termination, or (3) the state has not make
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-801 (2007).
D.C. CODE § 4-1301.02(10) (2001).
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.2 (2008).
See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 278.
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2012) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF STATE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARDS], available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.pdf (setting forth the state standards).
71. Id. at 2 & n.1 (listing twenty-eight states).
72. Id. at 2 & n.2 (listing nineteen states).
73. Id. at 3. These factors include a consideration of (1) the emotional relationship between the
child and parents, siblings, and other household members, (2) the ability of the parents to provide a
safe home and care for the child, (3) the mental and physical health of the parent and the child, and (4)
the presence of domestic violence in the home.
74. See SUMMARY OF STATE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 4.
75. ALA. CODE § 12-15-101(b)(2) (2008).
76. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (2013) [hereinafter SUMMARY
OF STATE GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION], available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (listing all state statutes).
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“reasonable efforts” to provide the family the services needed to ensure the
77
child can return home.
In sum, the current legal standards have moved at least partially in the
direction advocated by Mnookin, most notably with the imposition of a time
limit for returning a child home. This raises a series of questions: How do these
changes work in practice? Are families receiving family-preservation services
and are these services keeping children safe in their homes? And are the time
limits resulting in shorter stays in foster care and greater permanency for
children? In part III, I explore these questions.
III
DETERMINACY IN PRACTICE
One important lesson of the reforms of the last few decades is that legal
standards have moved in the direction that Mnookin sought, but there is still
considerable discrepancy between what is promised in the laws and what is
practiced on the ground. States do not fully invest in family-preservation efforts,
and the efforts that are in place appear to have had little impact on foster-care
placement rates. By contrast, even with only partial implementation, the time
limits have moved children more quickly through the system. There are some
data constraints, largely because the federal government did not begin
78
compiling comprehensive statistics until 1998, but the statistics set forth below
paint a vivid picture of the child-welfare system in the wake of legislative
reform.
A. Family-Preservation Efforts
1. In Practice
There is no requirement that states truly invest in family-preservation
79
services, and generally they do not. A quick glance at the federal budget
reveals that the federal funds available for out-of-home placement far exceed
the federal funds available for family preservation. In fiscal year 2011, Congress
77. For the federal statutory exceptions, see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). For the states that
incorporate these exceptions, see SUMMARY OF STATE GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION,
supra note 76, at 4.
78. ASFA introduced several reporting mechanisms. This article relies in particular on the
Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS), which began with fiscal year
1998. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
FINAL ESTIMATES FOR FY 1998 THROUGH FY 2002, at 14 (2006) [hereinafter AFCARS FINAL
ESTIMATES], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport12.pdf. For a
discussion of the limitations of the federal data, and particularly the biases that stem from the failure to
track entry cohorts, see Mark E. Courtney, Barbara Needell & Fred Wulczyn, Unintended
consequences of the push for accountability: The case of National Child Welfare Performance Standards,
26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1141, 1146–50 (2004).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 629b(a)(4) (2006) (requiring states to provide family-preservation services
along with “community-based family support services, time-limited family reunification services, and
adoption promotion and support services,” but requiring only “significant portions of . . . expenditures
for each such program”).
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allocated $4.4 billion for foster-care services, but only $365 million for family
services, an amount that is intended to cover family-preservation services,
community-based family-support services, adoption-promotion and support
80
services, and reunification services. There are other sources of discretionary
funds available for states to use for preventive programs, but even adding these
81
together, the bulk of federal money is still spent on foster care, not prevention.
To appreciate just how limited family-preservation-services funds are,
consider the experience of California. As one state official has said, two
pressing challenges facing California’s child-welfare system are that the bulk of
federal funds are reserved for out-of-home placement rather than services to
families, and that there is a “[w]oeful lack of [other] funding for prevention,
82
early intervention, and post-permanency services.” The budget numbers
demonstrate this reality: California receives $1.9 billion from the federal
83
government, but eighty-nine percent of this money is for out-of-home
84
placement. Only four percent is earmarked for family-preservation services
and other programs designed to keep children out of foster care or help
85
children who have left foster care.
At the national level, comprehensive assessments of family-preservation
efforts commissioned by the federal government paint a fairly dismal picture of
86
family-preservation services in practice. The overarching conclusion of one
80. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ALLPURPOSE TABLE — FY 2010–12 (2012) [hereinafter ALL-PURPOSE TABLE], available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/fy2012apt.pdf. The Children’s Bureau, within the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, administers the federal funds available for child
protection. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DIRECTORY OF PROGRAM SERVICES 15, available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
acf_directory.pdf (describing the work of the Children’s Bureau as providing support and guidance to
programs that (1) strengthen families and prevent child abuse and neglect, (2) protect children who
have been abused or neglected, and (3) ensure permanency for children).
81. There are numerous ways to count the prevention funds, and the comparison in the text
accounts only for mandatory (guaranteed) spending, not discretionary programs. Several funding
streams could be counted as preservation or, more broadly, prevention programs. But even after
aggregating these funds, the total amount still falls far short of the amount of money for foster-care
placement. See ALL-PURPOSE TABLE, supra note 80.
82. FRANK MECCA, CNTY. WELFARE DIRECTORS ASS’N OF CAL., FUNDING CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA 31 (2008), available at http://www.cwda.org/downloads/publications/cws/
CWSPresentation041408.ppt (further listing three additional challenges:“[o]bsolete and inflexible
federal funding scheme”; “[h]igh caseloads”; and “[r]eliance on other systems with their own priorities,
funding limitations, and accountability structures”).
83. Id. at 4.
84. See id. at 5–7 (showing that eighty percent of the funds are from Title IV-E and nine percent
are from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, both of which restrict spending to out-of-home
cases and do not fund prevention services).
85. See id. The remaining seven percent is in a category entitled “other.” Id. at 5. The state
supplements the federal funds with private funds to bolster prevention and preservation programs. See
id. at 8.
86. See JAMES BELL ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FAMILY
PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT (FP/FS) SERVICES IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 26–27 (2003)
[hereinafter FAMILY PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT STUDY], available at
http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/gateway/Blob/45860.pdf;jsessionid=CAAA8047B63
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report is that despite AACWA’s promises, the child-welfare system still falls
87
short of the goal of keeping children in their homes when possible. The report
found that although there are some quality programs, there are considerable
88
challenges in the delivery of services. Part of the problem is that of the four
different program areas—family preservation, community-based support,
adoption support, and reunification services—many states spend their funds on
89
adoption support and family reunification, not family preservation. In other
words, instead of working to keep children from entering foster care, states are
using the funds to help children exit foster care, often to adoptive homes.
Additionally, there is considerable resistance to family-preservation efforts
in agencies, particularly after a high-profile abuse case. Even when child-fatality
cases had not gone through the family-preservation system, for example, the
report found there was still a sense among child-welfare agencies that the
family-preservation mentality was responsible for children’s deaths in such
90
abuse cases. Finally, the report found that family-preservation programs do
little to address the multiple and complex problems facing families at risk of
91
involvement in the child-welfare system.
The choice not to invest in family-preservation services is understandable in
light of the mixed evidence about the effectiveness of such late-stage
92
interventions. Family-preservation programs typically aim to prevent fostercare placement and also to strengthen family functioning and improve child
safety. There are three basic program models: crisis intervention, home-based
93
treatment, and family treatment. One well-known crisis-intervention program
is Homebuilders, which was developed in Washington State in 1974.

74AE785AD3A759AE2A0A1?w=+NATIVE%28%27recno%3D45860%27%29&upp=0&rpp=10&r=
1&m=1; [VOL. A] JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL EVALUATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS: THE META-ANALYSIS (2001), available at
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/nefsp-vola.pdf; 2 WESTAT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATION OF FAMILY PRESERVATION AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS: FINAL
REPORT ch. 1 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/evalfampres94/final/Vol2/index.htm.
87. See FAMILY PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT STUDY, supra note 86, at 26–27.
88. Id.
89. Id. at xv.
90. Id. at 27–28.
91. Id. at 34. The report identified numerous other challenges, such as a lack of coordination
between social workers in the family-preservation programs and child-welfare case workers, with the
latter often unaware of the services provided through federally funded preservation programs. Id. at
xiv.
92. See WESTAT ET AL., supra note 86, at pt. 1.4 (reviewing studies of program effectiveness and
finding that in “[s]even of eleven studies . . . the programs did not produce significant overall reductions
in placement”).
93. Crisis intervention involves intensive work with a family, sometimes as much as twenty hours a
week, during a four- to six-week period, focusing on the provision of concrete services and counseling.
Home-based treatment is longer-term work over a period of four to five months, focusing on family
interaction and drawing on family-systems theory, and it also includes concrete services and counseling.
Finally, family treatment is less intensive treatment in the home and office and focuses more on
counseling rather than concrete services; it typically involves ninety-day treatment period followed by
weekly visits for up to five-and-a-half months. See id. at pts. 1.2 & 1.3.
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Homebuilders is an intensive program that delivers in-home services to families,
up to twenty hours a week, immediately following a crisis. The principle of
Homebuilders is that families, as a result of a crisis and the potential placement
of a child, will be more willing to change. Caseworkers, handling only one to
two families at a time, work intensively with the family, offering counseling and
94
concrete services for four to six weeks.
A national assessment of family-preservation efforts conducted a
randomized study of three programs based on the Homebuilders model, as well
95
as one less intensive but still home-based program. The assessment tracked
foster-care placement, child safety, family functioning, and the closure rate for
96
child-welfare cases. After following these outcomes for families in the
experimental and control groups, the evaluators concluded that there was no
statistically significant difference in foster-care placement between families
receiving the services and the control group, nor was there a difference in case97
closure rates. Additionally, families that received the intensive services did not
98
reunify with their children more quickly following a placement. Looking at
child safety, the study found no significant differences in maltreatment rates for
99
children in the two groups. Family functioning was somewhat higher for the
families receiving intensive treatment, but these improvements were not
100
sustained over time.
2. A Limited Effect
Turning to the statistical impact of family preservation, there is little
evidence that the introduction of these services since the time Mnookin was
writing has affected foster-care placement. Looking at three different
measures—the total number of children in care in the fiscal year, the number of
children in care on the last day of the fiscal year, and the number of children
101
entering care in the fiscal year—the statistics all tell a similar story. Rather
than lowering foster-care placement, the introduction of family-preservation
efforts in the 1980s is correlated with an increase in foster-care placement,
which rose steadily through the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a high in the late
102
1990s, and then steadily decreased in the 2000s.
94. Id. at pt. 1.1.
95. WESTAT ET AL., supra note 86, at executive summary. The final program offered family
counseling and services over a twelve-week period, focusing particularly on substance-abuse treatment.
Id.
96. Id. The control group was not an intervention-free group, but rather was assigned regular
child-welfare services. Id. at 4; see also id. at tbl.4 (setting forth the difference between the caseworker
intervention in the intensive family-preservation programs and the control groups, and noting
substantial differences in the amount and type of caseworker support and intervention).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 53.
102. See id. Decreases were uneven across the country, with some states, such as Nevada and Texas,

8_HUNTINGTON_EIC (RECOVERED)_JCI (3) (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

8/8/2014 10:37 AM

THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY

235

Figure 1: Foster-Care Population, 1982–2011
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This is not to suggest that the introduction of family-preservation services
caused the higher rates of foster-care placement. As any student of child
welfare readily knows, numerous factors affect placement rates, such as the
103
well-publicized death of a child known to the child-welfare system.
Beyond the politics of the child-welfare system, it is possible that the
changing foster-care rates are explained, at least partially, by an increase and
then decrease in rates of child abuse and neglect. The National Incidence Study
is an effort by the federal government to capture the actual incidence of child
maltreatment. The study—conducted in 1980, 1986, 1993, and 2006—relies on

experiencing sharp increases during the 2000s. CHILD TRENDS, FOSTER CARE DATA SNAPSHOT 4
(2011), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Child_Trends_2011_05_31_
DS_FosterCare1.pdf.
103. See John Courtney et al., Aggressive Prosecutions Flooding the System, 4 CHILD WELFARE
WATCH 4, 4 (1999) (documenting a fifty-five percent increase in filings of neglect cases and a fiftyseven percent increase in filings of abuse cases from 1995 to 1998 in New York City following the wellpublicized death of Elisa Izquierdo, a six-year-old girl who had been subjected to fatal abuse by her
mother and was known to the child-welfare authorities).
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interviews with professionals who work with children in a variety of settings,
and it sweeps in far more incidents of maltreatment than those investigated by
105
the child-welfare system.
These studies show an increase in child
106
maltreatment in the 1980s and 1990s and then a decrease in the 2000s.

104. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS–4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–4
(2010) [hereinafter NIS–4], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report_
congress_full_pdf_jan2010.pdf (describing the study’s sentinel-survey methodology, which looks far
beyond the reported cases by surveying community professionals who work with children in a variety of
settings, from police stations and hospitals to schools and emergency shelters).
105. Of the total number of maltreatment incidents found in the four iterations of the study, only a
minority were investigated by the child-welfare system: 33 percent, 44 percent, 28 percent, and 32
percent of the total incidents in 1980, 1986, 1993, and 2006, respectively. See NIS–4, supra note 104, at
16; ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS–3): REPORT TO
CONGRESS 7–16 (1996) [hereinafter NIS–3], available at http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/
docs/gateway/Blob/13635.pdf?w=+NATIVE%28%27IPDET+PH+IS+%27%27nis-3%27%27%27%29
&upp=0&rpp=-10&order=+NATIVE%28%27year%2Fdescend%27%29&r=1&m=6. The authors of
the study could not explain this discrepancy. See NIS–4, supra note 104, at 18 (“Children who do not
receive a CPS investigation represent an enigma to the study, in that it is not possible to say whether
sentinels who recognized their maltreatment did not report it to CPS or whether they did report it but
CPS screened their reports out without an investigation.”).
106. Looking only at the more stringent harm standard for maltreatment (and not the broader
category of endangerment added with the NIS–2), the overall maltreatment rate was 10.5 incidents per
1000 children in 1980, 14.8 in 1986, 23.1 in 1993, and then 17.1 in 2006. NIS–4, supra note 104, at 3–4;
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE
AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 16 (1981) [hereinafter NIS–1], available at
http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/gateway/Blob/12686.pdf?w=+NATIVE%28%27IP
DET+PH+IS+%27%27nis-1%27%27%27%29&upp=0&rpp=10&order=+NATIVE%28%27year%2Fdescend%27%29&r=1&m=2. The National Incidence Study
uses a narrow definition of child maltreatment, defined to include incidents where “through the
purposive acts or marked inattention to the child’s basic needs, behavior of a parent/substitute or other
adult caretaker caused foreseeable or avoidable injury or impairment to a child or materially
contributed unreasonable prolongation or worsening of an existing injury or impairment.” See NIS–1,
supra, at 4. The narrow definition thus does not include acts of a noncaretaker, unless the parent
“knowingly permitted” the acts or omissions. See id.
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Figure 2: Child-Maltreatment Rates, 1980–2006
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Source: NIS–4, supra note 104, at 3–4; NIS–1, supra note 106, at 16.

This increase and then decrease in child-maltreatment follows the same
trajectory as the foster-care placement rates, raising the possibility that an
increase in child maltreatment drove the increase in foster care. It is hard to
confirm this link as a definitive matter, because the relationship between child107
maltreatment rates and foster-care placement is complex, but the main point
107. A straightforward conclusion—supported by figure 1 and figure 2—is that an increase in child
maltreatment drove the increase in foster-care involvement. It could also be argued, however, that the
inverse is true. A change in the child-welfare-investigation policies might have driven up the childmaltreatment rate because the child-welfare system was more aggressive in identifying and
investigating cases. This theory might partially explain the increase in child maltreatment between 1980
and 1986, because both the number of cases investigated by the child-welfare system, and the overall
proportion of investigated to noninvestigated cases, rose during this time period. See NIS–3, supra note
105, at 7–16. Between 1986 and 1993, however, the foster-care population was rising but the number of
children investigated by the child-welfare system remained roughly the same. See id. (explaining that
the overall number of child-maltreatment incidents rose substantially during this period but that the
number of incidents investigated by child-welfare authorities in this period remained stable). A third
explanation, then, is that the kind of maltreatment investigated by the child-welfare system between
1986 and 1993 was more likely to result in removal and this is why the foster care population increased
during that period even though there were no more child-welfare investigations. In other words, the
system did not investigate more cases, but it was more likely to remove children based on what the
authorities found. At any rate, the point here is not to explain fully the relationship between foster-care
placement and child-maltreatment rates, but rather to note that family-preservation policies do not
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is that there is little evidence that AACWA’s emphasis on family preservation
had a significant impact on foster-care placement or that family-preservation
efforts sufficiently counteracted other forces pushing children into foster care.
Rather, the increase and then decrease in the foster-care population is likely
tied to other factors.
B. The Time Limit on Reunification Efforts
1. In Practice
Turning to Mnookin’s proposal that the law set a time limit on states’ efforts
to reunite children with their families, ASFA has resulted in some considerable
changes in practice, although fewer than might be expected. Rather than
applying the time limit strictly, states are more likely to invoke one of the three
108
exceptions to the time limit. Indeed, a report from the Government
Accounting Office found that the number of children subject to the exceptions
109
was far greater than the number of children subject to the limit.
Despite the repeated invocation of the time-limit exceptions, however, there
is some evidence that agency culture has changed in response to ASFA, with
110
caseworkers and agencies more generally focused on permanency.
In
particular, it appears that state agencies are making greater efforts to find
adoptive homes, even for otherwise hard-to-adopt children, such as children
111
with special needs and older children.
2. A Substantial Impact
Even partially implemented, ASFA’s time limit has had a substantial effect
on speeding children to permanent placements. It is difficult to compare today’s
system with that of 1975 because the federal statistics were not as thorough in
the 1970s, but there is evidence that children were in foster care for extended
periods of time when Mnookin was writing. Mnookin cited a study of foster
children in San Francisco, for example, which found that the average length of
time in foster care was five years and that sixty-two percent of the children were

appear to be a strong factor in foster care placement in the 1980s and early 1990s.
108. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 18–20. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services does not track states’ use of the limit or the exceptions. Id. at 20. Moreover, in a
phrase that echoes Mnookin’s critique of the best-interests standard, this report also found that
“[b]ecause the statutory provisions [setting the time limits] allow states discretion in individual cases, it
is difficult to assess how often states are applying these provisions in their strict form.” See id. at 18.
(For the content of the three exceptions, see text accompanying supra note 77.)
109. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-585, RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ON
FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REMAIN 27 (2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234761.pdf. The reasons for this vary by state, with some
states reporting a high number of children living with relatives, others saying they had not provided
parents needed services, and still others reporting that they were waiting for parents to voluntarily
relinquish their parental rights. See id. at 27–31.
110. Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 21–24.
111. See id. at 21–22.
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expected to remain in care until they reached the age of majority.
Looking at the impact of ASFA, the law appears to have had a significant
effect in a number of areas. Beginning with the median stay in foster care, in the
first year after ASFA was enacted (before the provisions had a chance to take
effect), the median stay for the children currently in foster care was 20.5
113
114
months. By 2011, the median stay in foster care had declined to 13.5 months.
Figure 3: Median Length of Stay in Foster Care, 1998–2011
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Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to
AFCARS Reports 10–20).

112. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 275 n.217 (citing unpublished manuscript).
113. See AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 3. This report replaced the data from the
earlier AFCARS reports. See id. at 14.
114. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2011 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2012, at 2 (2006) [hereinafter AFCARS FY 2011
DATA], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf. The mean,
however, was 23.9 months. Id. Of the children who exited foster care in fiscal year 2011, the median
stay was 13.2 months. Id. at 3.
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These shorter stays translate into greater permanency for children. Looking
at adoption, of the children who exited foster care in 2011, twenty percent were
115
116
adopted, as compared with only fifteen percent in 1998. Adoption rates,
however, differ by race. Even though fewer African American children are
117
entering foster care today, the adoption rates for African American children
have declined considerably, while the adoption rates of Latino and white
118
children have increased.
ASFA’s emphasis on adoption has also translated into faster adoptions for
more children. Of the children adopted in 1998, only sixteen percent had spent
119
less than two years in foster care. By 2005, twenty-nine percent of the children
120
adopted that year had spent less than two years in foster care. Additionally,
the time between the termination of parental rights and adoption has also
121
shortened since ASFA, from more than twelve months in 1998 to 9.7 months
122
in 2011.
One of the biggest successes in permanency is the increased use of
guardianships, which allow a child to be placed in the permanent custody of an
adult without terminating parental rights. In 2011, six percent of all children
123
leaving foster care were placed with guardians, as compared with only two
124
percent in 1998. This is a much-needed permanency option for older children
who may not want to be adopted, and for kinship caregivers who may not want

115. AFCARS FY 2011 DATA , supra note 114, at 3 (reporting 49,866 children adopted from foster
care in fiscal year 2011). This is clearly an improvement in adoption rates as compared with when
Mnookin was writing. Although there are not as reliable statistics, Mnookin reported there were very
few adoptions out of the child-welfare system in the 1970s. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 275 n.217
(citing A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 28 (1973)) (describing a study of the
foster care population in Massachusetts, which found that children had little chance of being adopted,
even though the parents of fewer than thirty percent of the children were interested in regaining
custody; the social workers’ primary reason for not finding adoptive homes was that the parents were
still interested).
116. AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8 (reporting 38,221 children adopted from
foster care in fiscal year 1998). Looking at cohorts, it appears that the cohort of children entering foster
care after ASFA had a greater chance of being adopted than the cohort of children entering foster care
before ASFA. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 26.
117. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER
CARE STATISTICS FY 2011, at 10 (2011) (finding that of the children entering foster care between 2001
and 2011, the percentage who were African American declined from twenty-eight percent to twentythree percent, and that the largest percentage increase was for Latino children).
118. Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 26–27. The national rate of transracial adoptions for
children in foster care has not increased since ASFA, with African American children still the least
likely to be adopted by white parents, and Latino children the most likely to be adopted by differentrace parents. See id. at 26.
119. Id. at 28. The period is measured by the length of time between the last removal and a
finalized adoption.
120. Id.
121. AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 13.
122. See AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 5.
123. Id. at 3.
124. AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8.
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125

to adopt. One of the reasons for the greater use of guardianships is the
126
Fostering Connections to Success Act of 2008, which permits states to use
federal child-welfare funds to subsidize guardianships when the guardian is a
127
relative, thus making guardianship a more viable option.
C. Assessing Mnookin’s Proposals
Looking at determinacy on the front end of foster-care placement, there is
no basis for evaluating Mnookin’s proposed standard because no state adopted
Mnookin’s stringent standard of removing a child only where (1) there are no
reasonable means for treating the family with the child still at home, and (2)
there are threats to a child’s health. If states had taken this approach, perhaps
the foster-care population would not have skyrocketed in the 1980s and 1990s.
We simply do not know, and the jury is still out on the effect of a more
determinate removal standard.
As the data demonstrate, foster-care placement rates do not seem affected
by an increased emphasis on family preservation through an indeterminate
standard. There are several possible explanations for this lack of success—
including differing maltreatment rates, poor study design, and
underinvestment—but it is also possible that the disconnect between familypreservation services and placement rates is because family preservation is so
difficult to achieve in the face of a family crisis. This does not necessarily mean
more children should be placed in foster care, but rather that we should reassess
how we can better prevent foster-care placement.
Turning to determinacy on the back end, when states adopted a determinate
standard for reunifying a family, and even when this reform was only partially
implemented, there was a substantial effect on permanency, speeding children
through the system more quickly and putting many of them in permanent
homes. It is here that Mnookin’s proposed reform appears to have had the
greatest effect. It is evidence that a determinate standard, even one with
considerable exceptions, can produce a sea change in practice. Whether the
costs of this change are acceptable is the subject of the next part.
IV
REFLECTIONS ON DETERMINACY
With several years experience, the time is ripe to assess the impact of childwelfare reform and think more broadly about the goals of the child-welfare
125. For an overview of this law and its place more generally in the child-welfare system, see
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 145–48 (2013). Subsidizing
guardianships also has helped move children out of foster care more quickly, contributing to greater
permanency. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSIDIZED
GUARDIANSHIP: CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS, at ii, 18 (2011), available at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/subsidized.pdf (finding that in some states, subsidized
guardianship has reduced length of time in foster care twenty-two to forty-three percent).
126. Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified at scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(28), 673(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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system. As elaborated below, the relative success of back-end determinacy
appears to have come at the cost of family reunification. And this tension
between permanency and reunification is not nearly as stark as it might be with
full implementation of the time limits. It is also time to reconsider what can be
done on the front end, to prevent foster-care involvement and, more precisely,
to lower rates of child maltreatment.
Given the challenge of late-stage preservation efforts, and the trade-off
between permanency and family reunification, the real emphasis in the childwelfare system should be on early-stage prevention, particularly programs that
address the root causes of child abuse and neglect. For the small number of
cases that will inevitably end up in the child-welfare system, we need to
formulate more realistic goals for children and parents based on the
acknowledgement that some parents will not make the needed changes in their
lives within the given time frame and that there will not be adoptive homes for
all children.
A. The Trade-Off Between Permanency and Reunification
The flip side of a time limit is that, not surprisingly, fewer children are
returning to their parents since the enactment of ASFA. In 1998, shortly after
the enactment of ASFA, sixty percent of the children leaving foster care
128
returned home to their parents. By contrast, in 2011, only fifty-two percent of
129
the children leaving foster care were reunified with their families.

128. AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8.
129. AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 3. Reunification rates vary by race, with African
American children the least likely to return to their families, even accounting for the higher rate of
kinship placements for African American children. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 28. In
other words, African American children in foster care are more likely than children of other races to be
placed with a relative—placements that are often long-term and that can turn into guardianships—but
even taking this into account, African American children are less likely to return to the care of their
parents. See id.
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Figure 4: Children Exiting Foster Care to Parental Custody, 1998–2011
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Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to
AFCARS Reports 10–20).

The shorter time frame allowed for foster-care placement is intended to move
children quickly to reunification or adoption, but in many cases the expedited
time line does not allow a parent to make the changes necessary to regain
custody. This is unsurprising in light of the substantial challenges facing
130
parents.
This decline in reunifications occurred with only partial
implementation of the time limit, so, presumably, there would be even fewer
reunifications if states imposed the time limit in more cases than they currently
130. See CHERYL SMITHGALL ET AL, PARENTS’ PASTS AND FAMILIES’ FUTURES 27 (2012),
available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/Parents%20Past%20and%20Families_08_30_
12-FINAL.pdf (describing a study of parents with children in the child-welfare system and finding that
“[t]he comprehensive assessments of these particular parents suggest that they have histories replete
with childhood trauma; adolescence characterized by substance use, limited educational attainment,
dysfunctional family paradigms, poor models for romantic relationships, a lack of stable employment,
and compounded problems in their current functioning (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, domestic
violence, etc.)”). See generally Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, FUTURE OF CHILD., Winter 2004,
at 95, available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_05.pdf
(describing the challenges of reunification).
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do.
This lower reunification rate is partly explained by the higher rate of
adoptions and guardianships. Deciding whether this trade-off between
permanency and reunification is acceptable is largely a matter of perspective
and values, but with the introduction of the time limit, the choice is in sharp
relief. It is tempting to imagine that the trade-off is avoidable and that there are
means for reunifying families within the tight time frame, but there has been
131
very little innovation on this front, so there is no evidence for evaluating
promising programs. Additionally, the return of children into foster care after a
132
failed reunification has always been a substantial risk, so the answer is not
necessarily returning children more quickly.
Even if reasonable minds can disagree about whether more adoptions and
guardianships and fewer reunifications is an acceptable trade-off, a more
troubling result of ASFA is that recent statistics show that children are
increasingly likely to leave foster care through emancipation. In these cases, the
state determines that the child cannot safely return home but the state also does
not find an alternative permanent home for the child. When the child reaches
age eighteen or twenty-one, foster care ends and the child is left with limited
133
support from the state. The young adults who are emancipated from foster
care tend to have very poor outcomes, including low educational attainment,
low earnings, high rates of pregnancy, relatively high rates of homelessness, and
134
so on. It is troubling, then, that eleven percent of the children leaving foster
135
care in 2011 were emancipated, as compared with only seven percent in
136
1998. Although there may be numerous reasons for this increase, the data
suggest that there are not adoptive homes for all children, particularly older
children. “Permanency” can be a lonely place.

131. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 28.
132. See Wulczyn, supra note 130, at 103–04 (discussing the high failure rate for family
reunifications, which appears to be decreasing over time, although also noting that this decrease could
be at least partly because the more recent reunifications have not had a chance to fail).
133. See CLARK M. PETERS ET AL., EXTENDING FOSTER CARE TO AGE 21: WEIGHING THE COSTS
GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE BENEFITS TO YOUTH 1–2 (2009), available at
TO
www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/Issue_Brief 06_23_09.pdf (describing the different
state foster-care systems that typically end at age eighteen; further describing a recent federal law
making funds available for states to extend foster care to age twenty-one).
134. Children Who Age Out of the Foster Care System: Hearing on H.R. 6893 and H.R. 6307 Before
the Subcomm. on Income Sec. & Family Support of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 75–
76 (2007) (statement of Mark Courtney, Ballmer Chair in Child Well-Being, School of Social Work,
University of Washington).
135. AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 3.
136. AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8.
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Figure 5: Children Exiting Foster Care to Emancipation, 1998–2011
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Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to
AFCARS Reports 10–20).

There are ways to tinker with the system, by, for example, developing a
more flexible time limit, perhaps along the lines suggested by Mnookin—where
each case would have a predetermined time limit, reflecting the circumstances
of each family. These particularized determinations would go beyond the three
exceptions already built into the law. With older children, for example, a longer
time frame would be permissible. Or if the problem is securing adequate
housing, rather than treating a recurring substance abuse problem, a longer
time frame might also make sense.
But the hard truth is that for many families the math does not favor family
reunification. The determinate standard exposes this reality. It also forces us to
rethink the goals and possibilities of the child-welfare system. Rather than
believe that a shortened time frame truly gives parents a chance to address the
issues that led to the removal, and rather than wish there were adoptive families
or guardianships for all children, the system should work much harder and,
crucially, much earlier to keep children out of foster care altogether.
B. Building a Different Machine
At some level, Mnookin’s proposals are thoughtful efforts to fix a broken
machine. It certainly might be possible to develop a more determinate removal
standard that states would be willing to adopt, but this will not be easy in light
of the general resistance among child-welfare agencies to family-preservation
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137

efforts. Nor is it clear such a standard would affect foster-care placement
138
given the unproven record of family-preservation efforts. By contrast, the
determinate reunification standard is successful, but it comes at considerable
costs.
Rather than focusing so much attention on families at the brink of a crisis or
immediately afterwards, we should build a different machine that more directly
addresses the conditions that lead to child abuse and neglect, particularly
limited social and financial resources. There will always be some need for a
child-welfare system, but rather than try so hard to fix the system, we should
reduce the need for it.
A promising approach is to strengthen families from the start. There are
139
numerous ways to do so, but there is a mechanism that is already part of the
current child-welfare system. One of the permissible expenditures for funds
from the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act is for “family support
140
services.” In contrast to family-preservation programs, which are intended for
specific families facing imminent risk of foster-care placement, family-support
programs are intended to serve an entire community in order to strengthen
141
families to avoid crises. These programs offer services such as parenting
education, social support, case management and referral services, center-based
142
early-childhood education, adult education, and so on. With the exception of
center-based early-childhood education, most of the programs work with
parents rather than directly with children, reflecting the belief that helping
143
parents helps children.
There is considerable evidence that these efforts are effective at avoiding
family breakdown. In a national assessment commissioned by the federal
government, evaluators conducted a meta-analysis of 665 studies of 260
144
different family-support programs around the country. The assessment found
that the programs made measurable improvements for children’s cognitive
development, children’s social and emotional development, parenting attitudes
145
and knowledge, parenting behavior, and family functioning. Many of the

137. See supra text accompanying note 90.
138. See supra text accompanying note 91.
139. Indeed, this is the subject of my recent book, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 629 (2006).
141. JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., supra note 86, at ii. Both family-preservation services and familysupport programs are funded through the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-133, 115 Stat. 2413 (2002).
142. JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., supra note 86, at A5-1.
143. Id.
144. Id. at A2-7.
145. See id. at A5-2 to -9. The assessment tracked four child outcomes (cognitive development and
school performance, social and emotional development, health, and safety) and five parent outcomes
(parent attitudes and knowledge, parenting behavior, family functioning, parental mental health and
health-risk behaviors, and economic well-being). For the other child and parent outcomes, there were
also statistically significant improvements, but the meaning of the differences was less clear and thus
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programs did not track child maltreatment specifically, but the improvement
in family functioning and parenting skills is some evidence that these programs
can prevent child abuse and neglect.
I have written at length elsewhere about the value of broad-based
147
prevention programs. The point here is not to describe these programs and
their benefits in detail, but rather to argue that there is another way to improve
outcomes for children. Prevention can work, but it requires considerable
investment in family functioning. Given the enormous direct costs of the current
148
system—$29.4 billion in 2010 —this is not necessarily a matter of new
investments, but rather shifting the focus from a reactive child-welfare system
toward a system that nurtures family functioning early on, long before a family
maltreats a child. This approach differs from family preservation because it
does not begin work when a family reaches a crisis. Instead, the work starts at
the point of family formation, seeking to strengthen the family to avoid a crisis
entirely. This new approach should not be part of the child-welfare system at all
but instead integrated into broader policies about children and families.
A preventive approach to child well-being is both better for children and
149
more cost-effective, but transitioning away from the current reactive approach
150
will not be easy culturally, politically, or fiscally. Consider, for example, the
funding challenges. Saving substantial amounts of money over the long run is
appealing, but funding streams are baroque. Investments made by one segment
of the government (a health department providing prenatal care, for example),
may be realized by another (the education system), but when budgets are in
silos, there is little incentive for one institution to make investments that
another institution will realize. This is difficult within any one level of
government—say, at the local or state level—but the problem is even more
difficult in our federalist system. When a state government invests in earlychildhood education, expenditures may result in fewer welfare applicants down
the road, but the savings will be reaped, at least in part, by the federal
government. This is not an easy problem to solve, but it does clarify the need to
think about costs and benefits more holistically and to create a funding scheme
the researchers were wary about attributing the differences to the programs. See id. at A5-2 to -3.
146. See id. at A5-24.
147. See Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485,
1531–34 (2007) [hereinafter Huntington, Mutual Dependency]; Clare Huntington, Neuroscience and the
Child Welfare System, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 37 (2012); Clare Huntington, Purple Haze, 109 MICH. L. REV.
903, 913–14 (2011) (reviewing NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES:
LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010)).
BOOK,
supra
note
53,
at
ch.
11,
available
at
148. GREEN
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2012-green-book/chapter-11-child-welfare/introductionand-overview (providing statistics for state fiscal year 2010). A little more than half the money came
from state and local sources and the remainder from the federal government. See id. (reporting that
$15.8 billion, or fifty-four percent of the total, was from state and local sources and that $13.6 billion, or
forty-six percent of the total, was from the federal government).
149. See Huntington, Mutual Dependency, supra note 147.
150. I address all these issues in my book, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 139.
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that provides the correct incentives to invest in family relationships.
Another challenge is that unlike the federal government, which can legally
run a deficit, state and local governments are often required by law to balance
151
their budgets every year. For this reason, a program that requires an outlay
today but provides a return only in the future simply may not be possible. There
is no way around this problem of a delayed return on investment and this is a
reason why centralized federal funding, even if it devolves control to states and
localities, is essential.
Even with an effective prevention program in place, there will still be some
need for foster care. In these cases, it is essential to develop more realistic goals
for children and parents. This means accepting the dual reality that many
parents cannot turn their lives around in a short period, and that there is not an
adoptive home for every child. One promising way forward is to expand
152
guardianships. As described above, guardianship is an excellent option for
older children and children in care with relatives because it provides a
permanent home for the child without terminating parental rights.
Guardianship programs recognize that family members’ lives are complex and
that a child and parent often maintain a connection even though it is
inappropriate to return the child to the parent’s custody. There is room for
much innovation on this front, and guardianships may be a way around the
unforgiving math of the current legal framework.
V
CONCLUSION
Mnookin was right to focus on determinacy. Many of the problems in the
child-welfare system in both 1975 and today stem from unclear standards about
when the state can remove a child and what the state should do with a family
afterwards. But even with substantial efforts to increase determinacy, the childwelfare system still too often fails to serve families well. Children may be
spending less time in foster care, but they endure the trauma of removal. And
too many children are never finding a home, either with their original or a new
family. The real challenge then is to strengthen families long before a crisis.
Increasingly, we are learning that this is possible. It will take money and effort,
but it will be well worth the investment.

151. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. II, § 24.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 123–127.

